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The move of India’s Government to nullify Article 370 of the Constitution not only
broadened the legislative powers of the Union Parliament over the Jammu &
Kashmir (‘State/J&K’) but also demoted J&K to the position of a Union Territory.
Much has been written about its constitutional validity, mostly from the vantage point
of the Government’s power to bring about the changes and their legitimacy. In this
blog post, I will limit my discussion to the question of whether Article 370 is a basic
feature of the Constitution of India. Given the sacrosanct political arrangement it
encapsulates as well as its role as an exemplar of Indian federal asymmetry, it is
now upon the Supreme Court to formally acknowledge the constitutional basis of
India’s delicate distribution of powers.
Permanently Temporary: The Nature of Article 370
The key to determining the basic structure question in relation to Article 370 is to
understand its exact nature. While the marginal note of the provision characterizes
it as a ‘Temporary Provision’, a number of Supreme Court (‘Court’) decisions have
characterized it as having a continued existence and being permanent. Critics of
the provision have argued that it was meant only as an interim arrangement and
automatically lapsed once the constituent assembly for J&K was dissolved in 1957.
On the other hand, those opposing this line of reasoning have sought to rely on the
decisions of the Court to contend that the permanence attached to the provision by
the Supreme Court has elevated it to the status of a basic feature of the Constitution.
In so far as the first argument is concerned, the Court has on various occasions,
including in Sampath Prakash and Santhosh Gupta,relied on Article 370 (3) to
suggest that the provision continues to be in existence. Thus, the Court has
observed that the provision will cease to have effect only when the President makes
a public notification to the contrary, subject to the condition laid down in clause 3
– i.e. recommendation of the Constituent Assembly for J&K – being fulfilled. The
J&K High Court in Ashok Kumar has in fact gone one step further and has observed
that the provision cannot be abrogated even using the amending powers of the
Parliament under Article 368. The reference to Article 368 and the fetters on it is
indicative of how a lot of people have come to view Article 370 as a basic feature of
the Constitution.
Although the Supreme Court has alluded to Article 370 as permanent, it would not
be prudent to read too much into it. To start with, the question of the provision’s
permanence or otherwise was not specifically in issue in any of the above cases.
More importantly though, it has never been clarified what ‘permanent’ actually
means. None of the Supreme Court decisions has explicitly equated such
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permanence to the Article being a basic feature. Also, unlike the J&K High Court, the
Supreme has not mentioned any bar on the amending powers of the Parliament in
these decisions.
Given these, we will have to look at other avenues to determine whether the
provision qualifies as a basic feature. One way of doing it would be to rely on clause
3, as it requires the recommendation of a ‘higher law-making’ body to abrogate it.
Another way is to examine if the political arrangements, such as the one brought
about by Article 370, have been identified by the Court to be a basic feature. In this
regard, the decision in R Ganpatrao v. Union of India is instructive. The Petitioners in
Ganpatrao were rulers of some of the erstwhile princely states, who had relinquished
their powers and joined the Indian Dominion by signing Instruments of Accession
and Instruments of Merger, much like in the case of Kashmir’s accession. One
of the guarantees extended to them at the time of acceding to the Union was
the annual payment of privy purses and certain other privileges. These promises
were crystallized in the Constitution as well, in the form of Articles291 and 362.
Nevertheless, the said provisions were abrogated by a constitutional amendment.
The Petitioner challenged the validity of the amendment on the ground that, among
others, the provisions were a basic feature of the Constitution and could not have
been repealed. They contended that the very identity of the Indian Union would have
been different if not for the accession of these princely states, which in turn was
achieved through the guarantees extended in the form of privy purses and other
privileges. Thus, the arguments advanced in Ganpatrao follow a trajectory similar to
what would be taken against the repeal of Article 370: the identity of the Indian Union
would have been different had it not been for the promise embedded in Article 370
and its repeal would disturb the basic structure.
The bench in Ganpatrao though rejected the above argument and held that the
provisions did not form part of the basic features. One of the primary reasons cited
for this conclusion was that the accession was inevitable, even if the rulers of the
princely states wished otherwise, since the ‘will of the people’ of the states was in
favour of joining the dominion of India. Thus, the Petitioner’s argument that the Union
of India would have been fundamentally different had it not been for the decision
of the rulers to accede was found to be without merit. Thus, as one commentator
has suggested, Ganpatrao rejects the idea that basic features are to be found in
historically significant political events which make up the Indian Union as we know it
today.
It would be interesting to see how Article 370 would fare if tested against the ratio in
Ganpatrao. One of the questions which might come up is whether, like in Ganpatrao,
the accession was a mere political inevitability even if the Maharaja did not accede.
This is a rather vexed historical enquiry and even if a judicial body were to venture
into that, it is unlikely to find a conclusive answer. Moreover, even if the Court were
to conclude that the identity of the Union of India would have been different if not
for the guarantee in Article 370, it is uncertain that merely because the provision
crystallizes historical political arrangements, it would be accorded the tag of a basic
feature.
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Unbalancing the Federal Power Balance
Another potential argument for classifying Article 370 as a basic feature is that its
destruction strikes at the root of India’s asymmetric federalism. While federalism
itself has been recognized as a basic feature, it is unclear whether asymmetry is
an essential attribute of it. Although the courts do not directly answer this, there
are clues to suggest that this is the case. For instance, the Supreme Court has
harped upon the federal balance of distribution of legislative and executive powers
as a fundamental feature of India’s federalism. Asymmetrical arrangements,
as in the case of Article 370 can be argued to be paradigm examples of such
federal balancing of powers. Given that India is a quasi-federal system with strong
centralizing tendencies, any exceptions carved out to this status quo (as in the case
of Article 370) should carry with them a presumption that they are specifically meant
to ensure such delicate balancing of federal powers. Moreover, given that such an
asymmetrical relationship has been subjected to the will of a higher law-making
body, there is a strong case to be made for classifying Article 370 as an essential
feature of federalism and thus in turn a basic feature. 
Despite this normative justification, the existence of Article 3, which vests wide
discretion on the Union to, inter alia, alter the boundaries of a state or even a create
a new state, may be seen as negating it. While the Article does not specifically
envisage the destruction of a state, the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal
v Union of India has observed that the powers under Article 3 extend to even
completely extinguishing a state. Whether or not the observation holds precedential
value, it sits uneasily with the ideas of states being sovereign in their spheres as
well as differential distribution of federal powers. Nevertheless, Article 3 envisages a
geographical disruption as opposed to the disruption of the federal power balance.
Such a disruption goes to the root of de facto asymmetry, which involves differential
distribution of territory, resources etc., as opposed to de jure asymmetry, which
involves the differential distribution of powers to federal sub-units. But, this still
leaves open the question of how de jure asymmetry may be retained if the territorial
sanctity of a state is completely destroyed. A way for courts to balance these
seemingly conflicting positions is to hold that the exercise of powers under Article
3 cannot be done in a way as to disrupt the federal balance or with an intention to
covertly usurp the constitutionally guaranteed powers of a state. In the case of J&K,
it should also be noted that Article 3 is not to be applied without the consent of the
State. Given the Supreme Court’s own position that constitutional interpretation has
to be done keeping in mind the constitutional values that the text seeks to achieve,
this argument holds much strength. Thus, Article 3 can arguably only be exercised in
a manner to further asymmetry and not destroy it.
Looking Ahead
One of the critical issues raised by the evisceration of Art 370 is whether federal
asymmetry, which has been an insignia of the Indian federal experiment, would
now experience a free fall. This concern is highlighted by the ‘one nation, one
constitution’ slogan which accompanied the scrapping of Art 370. Many also fear
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that the removal of special status to J&K is a slippery slope, capable of jeopardizing
federal asymmetry in general. A way to combat this is to recognize that federal
asymmetry is an essential attribute of the Indian federal design. While this is yet to
be formally acknowledged, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to do so in the
Kashmir issue.
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